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J. Helen Beck* Employment Law and the
Mentally Handicapped
Mental handicaps affect a suprisingly large part of the community.
If the handicapped cannot make themselves self-sufficient, they
become a great economic burden whereas they may have the
potential of being contributors to society. This paper will examine
aspects of the law relating to employment opportunity and certain
social service structures, and question the extent to which they further a
handicapped person's goal of fulfilling his employment potential.
Field research was done only in the Halifax area, but the analysis is
pertinent across Canada because the statutory provisions, social
services and social assistance structures found in Halifax are on the
whole similar to those found across Canada.
I. Scope of the Problem
It is difficult to deal with the employment problems of the mentally
handicapped because there has been so little empirical research on
the topic. There has not even been a serious investigation of what
should be the definition of a mental handicap for the purposes of
eligibility for employment. Are developmental disabilities' such as
autism, cerebral palsy and epilepsy to be classified as mental
handicaps? Can a mental handicap be termed a physical handicap if
it is due to structural brain damage as is the case in Downs
syndrome? Can conditions such as schizophrenia or manic
depression, which have a chemical basis, be termed physical
handicaps? We are involved here with more than semantics, for the
answer will affect whether the handicapped person is within the
scope of particular pieces of legislation. The question is initially one
for medical experts but there is no reason why definitions developed
for medical purposes should limit the scope of modem social
welfare legislation.
*J. Helen Beck, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1980. Ms. Beck wishes to thank Professor Innis
Christie for his invaluable guidance and assistance.
1. For a definition of this term see R.H.A. Haslam, "Medical Parametics", The
Developmentally Disabled and their Legal Rights [Abstracts], prepared for
Distribution At The Developmentally Disabled and Their Legal Rights Symposium
(1974) and published by The John F. Kennedy Institute for the Habilitation of the
Mentally and Physically Handicapped Child.
Employment Law and the Mentally Handicapped 259
Whatever the definition of mental handicap, whether relating to
mental retardation or to various types of mental illness, statistics are
always sparse. There are no statistics relating to the potential of the
handicapped for employment.2 The absence of statistics is due to
more than simply the lack of research. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to quantify in this area because so much of a mentally
handicapped person's eligibility for employment is affected by
variables that are almost impossible to exclude or control, such as
his self-image, the attitudes of those around him, including fellow
employees, and co-existing physical, mental, psychological,
economic and social problems.
The only existing statistics that give some idea of the number of
people affected are those which show the incidence of mental
retardation and mental illness in the general population. Mental
retardation is determined on the whole by I.Q. scores. This is a
highly questionable means of categorization, but it is the only
means available. According to traditional modes of determination it
is clear that an unexpectedly large percentage of the population is
affected by mental retardation, and that an overwhelming number of
mentally retarded are capable of performing a useful function in
society.3 Mental disorder, as well, is far more prevalent than most
people realize. The following figures give some idea of the extent of
the problem. In 1977, 60,000 Canadians were hospitalized for
mental illness; 4 upward of one-third of the population has suffered
some temporary disability because of emotional problems;5 between
one-third and two-thirds of the population in three communities
studied showed symptoms of disorder recognizable by
psychiatrists.6 The last statistic is an indication of the difficulty of
defining mental illness in a meaningful way.
2. Statistics Canada, C.A.M.R. and C.M.H.A. do not keep statistics on the
employment of the handicapped. They can not be traced through provincial funding
or services as funding is based on an approved budget not the number of "clients"
(interview with Norma Lloyd, supervisor of Special Projects, Department of Social
Services, Province of Nova Scotia).
3. See Appendices I and II
4. G. Hardy, "Law Talk: Mental Patients and the Law; Part I: Society's Fear of IlI
Compounds Problems", The Columbian of New Westminister, B.C. (April 27,
1978)
5. Mentioned in a 1976 fund-raising pamphlet for Mental Health, Ottawa
6. M. G. Reinhardt, "The Incidence of Mental Disorder" (1972), 6 Studia
Caronica 209, at 220-221. The three communities studied were in rural Sweden,
rural Canada and New York City.
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The experiences of Goodwill Industries of America, the Canadian
Association of the Mentally Retarded, and the Canadian Mental
Health Association provides the basis for an estimate of the
incidence of mental handicaps sufficiently severe to affect
employment. 7 Application of the model to the Metropolitan Area of
Halifax, Dartmouth and Halifax County, having a population of
271,768, resulted in an estimate of 258 mentally retarded persons
and 865 psycho-socially disabled8 persons in need of vocational
services. The number of mentally handicapped in need of vocational
services is at least as great as the number of similarly physically
handicapped. Another local survey indicated that the need for
special vocational training is even greater in that those who have
"overcome" their mental illness have had enormous difficulty in
obtaining employment.9 Of the population studied 41.7% were
employed prior to hospitalization, 30.0% looked for work after
discharge, but only 15.5% were actually working.
It is with these people, who have mental handicaps severe enough
to render them presently "unemployable", but who have the
potential for rehabilitation that the law relating to employment must
be especially concerned. In other words, the special challenge to the
law to respond fairly is presented by those who have undergone
periods of institutionalization for mental illness 0 and by the
mentally retarded who are neither very severely nor very mildly
retarded. But the "Moyer Report" disclosed that in 1977 of the
approximately 1000 psycho-socially disabled, or mentally ill, in the
Halifax Metropolitan area not in hospitals, only 620 received any
type of service. Vocational/educational services were the most
neglected: such services were received by only 3% (14) of those not
living in institutions and by 15% (91) of the total 620.11 The
situation does not appear to have changed significantly since 1977.
7. See Appendix III
8. Ad Hoe Committee on Community Activity Programs, "Proposal to
Metropolitan Mental Health Planning Board re: Comprehensive Services for the
Psycho-Socially Disabled" (1977) (hereinafter referred to as the "Moyer
Report"), at p. 2. The "Moyer Report" defines psycho-socially disabled people
"to include at least those who are not able to function at an optimum level because
of a psychiatric illness, and who require some type of rehabilitative service."
9. Staff of "Through the Looking Glass", "Through the Looking Glass: An
Explanatory Survey of the World of Ex-Mental Patients in the Halifax Area"
(1973)
10. Even if the chronically ill recover sufficiently to be released they probably will
not be able to achieve competitive employment. See note 148
11. "Moyer Report", supra note 8, at 4
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In March 1979 it was estimated that approximately 90 mentally
retarded, most of them moderately retarded, were receiving
vocational/educational services in the Halifax Metropolitan area
(and 16 or 17 of them are learning basic living, not employment
skills).
12
It is reasonably clear: (i) that a larger proportion of the population
is affected to some degree by mental retardation or mental illness
than one would suspect and (ii) that while most could be gainfully
employed in some capacity, vocational/educational services are
essential for them to achieve their potential and such services are not
readily available, especially for the mentally ill. This is particularly
regrettable for the mentally ill when one realizes that it is
theoretically possible for them, unlike all but the most mildly
mentally retarded, to be "cured" of their handicap and thus enabled
to compete in the employment market: Both public attitudes and the
law contribute to this situation.
II. Inability To Form Contract
The usefulness of a contractual analysis of the employment of the
mentally handicapped is highly questionable. If a person's mental
ability is sufficiently impaired to prevent him from having the
capacity to be a party to a contract of employment he is unlikely to
seek employment. This probably accounts for the fact that most
Contract Law texts have no more than a few paragraphs on the
subject of the ability of a mentally handicapped person to form a
contract of employment. Perhaps there is no greater claim for a
purely contractual analysis of the employment relationship in this
context than that it is of some technical legal sigrificance, 13 but the
principles on which the law rests do demonstrate the way that
society views the mentally handicapped.
Because the ordinary rules of law presuppose the existence of a
normal individual they do not apply to those whose mental functions
are limited due to infancy, mental illness or mental retardation. If
any of these conditions exist special rules apply.1 4 A contract of a
12. George Matthews, Director of Department of Social Services, Province of
Nova Scotia. It should be noted that according to Clarie Edwards-Doherty, Director
of the Adult Services Centre, the clients are mainly modelately retarded.
13. M. R. Freedland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1976), at 1
14. M. Brown, "Can the Insane Contract? A Review of the Law Relating to the
Contracts of Persons of Unsound Mind" (1933), II Can. B. Rev. 600, at 601 citing
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mentally handicapped may be avoided on the basis of. (i) mental
incapacity to contract at the time of the offer or (ii) supervening
insanity between the time of making the offer and acceptance.
A. Incapacity at the Time of the Offer
The first of these grounds, which is the more relevant to the
employment contract, is replete with inconsistencies, because
'justice', not logic, has shaped the law. '5 Since Imperial Loan Co.
Ltd. v. Stone16 in 1892, the common law has generally required a
person who alleges that he was insane at the time of contracting to
establish: (i) that at the time of contracting he did not know what he
was doing and (ii) that the person with whom he contracted knew
him to be so insane as not to be capable of understanding what he
was about. Critics of the second requirement allege that it is not
only overly stringent but deviates from the earlier common law. 17
They hoped that two cases' 8 in the early 1900's would open the way
for discarding it. However, Imperial Loan was confirmed by the
Court of Appeal in 192519 and appears to have been widely
accepted in Canada.2
0
A 1961 Nova Scotia case 2' does however raise some doubts as to
the applicability of the second requirement in this jurisdiction.
Although the case could have been decided on the alternate ground
of undue influence and the point was not argued by counsel, the
majority was willing to set aside the agreement without even
mentioning the second requirement 22 and the minority, in
agreement on this point, argued that the second requirement should
not be imposed on voluntary dispositions.23
G. B. Tuke and C.R.A. Howden, "The Relation of the Insanities to Criminal
Responsibility and Civil Capacity" (1904), 16 Jurid. Rev. 1 and 361
15. See Part IIC for details
16. [1892] 1 Q.B. 599
17. Brown, supra, note 14 at 602, 617-623; W.G.H. Cook, "Mental Deficiency
and the English Law of Contract" (1921), 21 Colum. L. Rev. 424 at 431-439
18. McLaughlin v. Daily Telegraph, [1904] A.C. 776 (P.C.) (Aust.); Molyneux v.
NatalLand Co., [1905] A.C. 555 (P.C.) (Natal)
19. York Glass Co. Ltd v. Jubb (1925), 134 L.T. Rep. 36
20. Conrad v. Halifax Lumber Co. (1918), 52 N.S.R. 250 (N.S.S.C.); Wilson
v.R., [1938] .S.C.R. 317;Hardman v. Falk, [1955] 1 D.L.R. 432 (B.C.S.C.);Re
Insurance Act; Re Rogers (Deceased) No. 1 (1963), 42 W.W.R. (N.S.) 200
(B.C.S.C., C.A.)
21. Corkum, by her Guardian, Montreal Trust Company and Douglas v. The Nova
Scotia Trust Company (1961), 46 M.P.R. 236 (N.S.S.C. in banco)
22. Id., at 238
23. Id., at 260-262 (per Ilsley, C. J.)
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Where a mental incompetent seeks thus to avoid a contract he
appears to have the onus of proving both his own incapacity and the
other's knowledge of this. 24 The common law has always been
concerned with commitment to a mental institution and previous
adjudgements of incompetency. Although in Nova Scotia the
process for appointment of a guardian of a person's estate, on the
face of it, is restricted to insane persons or lunatics 25 or habitual
drunkards, 26 in other jurisdictions it is possible for the following to
be the subject of incompetency or similar proceedings: dependent
adults, 27 the mentally infirm, the mentally ill, drug addicts,
28
alcoholics, incompetents, epileptics, deficients, spend-thrifts and
others. 29 In most jurisdictions institutional commitment facilitates
30
or necessitates3' an examination of incompetency.
In attempting to establish the incapacity to understand a particular
transaction the following types of evidence should be presented to
the court on behalf of an alleged incompetent: the nature and
complexity of the transaction in issue, prior adjudications of
incapacity, hospitalization, lay and expert (on I.Q. or mental
condition) opinion testimony.32 It is hard to determine the evidential
value and weight of each of these factors as the courts' decisions are
24. G. A. Coutts, "'Contracts of Mental Incompetents" (1963), Special Lectures
of the Law Society of Upper Canada 49, at 63, citing Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone,
supra note 16. However in Corkum, by her Guardian, Montreal Trust Company
and Douglas v. The Nova Scotia Trust Company, supra note 21, at 262, Ilsley
pointed out that there are several cases which raise at least a doubt as to whether
this is so.
25. Incompetent Persons Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 135, subs. 1(b), 2(2), 8, as am.
26. Inebriates' Guardianship Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 144, ss. 1, 2, 12, as am.
27. Dependent Adults Act, S.A. 1976, c. 63, subs. l(d), 6, 25, as am.
28. Patients' Estate Act, S.B.C. 1962; c. 44, subs. 3(1), as am. by S.B.C. 1976,
c. 33, s. 104; Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-8, s. 39; Mental
Incompetency Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 271, s. 39; The Mentally Disordered Persons
Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 346, s. 42, as am. by S.S. 1972, c. 71. The legislation in
Manitoba, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Quebec was not surveyed.
29. R. A. Farmer, The Rigths of the Mentally Ill, (New York: Acro Publishing
Co., Inc., 1967), at 18-19
30. Dependent Adults Act, S.A. 1976, c. 63, s. 50, as am.; Patients' Estate Act,
S.B.C. 1962, c. 44, ss. 2, 12, 13, as am. by S.B.C. 1964, c. 36, ss. 2, 6; S.B.C.
1965, c. 32, ss. 3, 4; S.B.C. 1968, c. 36, ss. 2, 3; S.B.C. 1976, c. 33, s. 104;
Public Trustee Act, S.N.S. 1973, c. 12, s. 7, as am. by S.N.S. 1976, c. 16, s. 18;
The Mental Health Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 345, s. 21, as am. by S.S. 1970, c. 43, s.
12; S.S. 1972, c. 76, s. 3; S.S. 1976, c. 35, s. 5
31. Mental Health Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-10, subs. 36 (1); Hospitals Act,
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 249, s. 47, as am. by S.N.S. 1977, c. 45, ss. 1, 8; The Mental
Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 269, s. 32, as am. by S.O. 1978, c. 50, s. 13
32. "Mental Illness and Contracts" (1959), 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1020, at 1040-49
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often influenced by innate principles of fairness and justice. They
may also confuse the issue of incapacity with the issue of whether a
lesser form of mental disability should influence them to grant
equitable relief on grounds of misrepresentation, undue influence,
unconscionable transaction or fraud.
Where it does exist, the right to avoid the contract may be said,
generally, to be for the protection of the mental incompetent.
However, where mental capacity is a fundamental part of the
contract the other party may apply to have the contract avoided, and
in this case he should not know of the incapacity.3 3 An employer,
for instance, might well wish to, and probably could, avoid a
contract of employment in these circumstances. This exception
may, of course, be incidentally advantageous to an employee
because after the contract is cancelled the court will not enforce any
obligations under it, such as, for example, a restraint of trade
clause.
Once an allegedly mentally incapable employee has established
the two requirements to the court's satisfaction, or once the
employer has established that at the time of contracting he was not
aware of the employee's mental incapacity and that mental capacity
was a fundamental part of the contract, the contract is voidable, not
void. 34 The court, therefore, will not cancel the contract if the party
seeking to avoid the contract is the mentally incapable employee
and he has affirmed it in a sane interval, or if the party seeking to
avoid the contract has obtained a benefit that can not be restored to
the other party. 35 In the normal employment situation it will be the
employee who has given part performance without receiving a
benefit (as wages are normally paid on a periodic basis) so if the
employee is the party asking that the contract be cancelled, the court
would probably have no hesitation in doing so, although
33. Coutts, supra note 24, at 64 suggests that if he actually knew of the incapacity
it may be a fraud to enter into the contract.
34. A. H. Hudson, "Some Problems of Mental Incompetence in the Law of
Contract and Property" (1961), 25 Convey. 319, at 335. The author states three
exceptions to the rule, referred to in Gibbons v. Wright (1953-54), 91 C.L.R. 423
(Aust. H. C.): the purported appointment of an agent or attorney; the case of the
somnambulist; and the insane person signing a document in a frenzy. In England
and Canada mental incompetents so declared are another exception.
35. Coutts, supra note 24, at 65-67 states that Wilson v. R., supra note 20, is the
sole exception to the rule requiring a mentally incompetent to restore any benefits
that he has received before he may have the contract set aside. Although Coutts
does not extend this requirement to situations where the other party is requesting
equitable cancellation, it seems reasonable to do so.
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presumably it will wish to make the cancellation equitable.
No matter who is seeking to avoid the contract the important
question will be whether the employer will be obliged to pay for any
benefit from the employee's part performance. Unless there is
overriding legislation any benefit will have to be compensated for
on a quantum meruit basis, although the court will look to the terms
of the contract for guidance. It is submitted, moreover, that the
Apportionment Act of each Canadian province is overriding
legislation and would be applicable to the employment contract of a
mental incompetent because the terms of the contract would be
considered to have been in force until the contract was cancelled. In
Nova Scotia it has been judicially determined that the effect of the
Apportionment Act36 is that "subject to any agreement to the
contrary, the person who earns a salary acquires a claim to it from
day to day and the person who has to pay it acquires an obligation to
pay it from day to day, as earned". 37 Thus it would seem that under
the Apportionment Act an employer, even one who had received no
benefit from part performance, would be required to pay the
employee's accrued salary upon cancellation.
Under English and Canadian law separate rules apply to the
person for whom an adjudgement of incompetency is still
outstanding. 38 A public body39 or a private body40 will have been
36. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 10
37. Lee v. MacDonald; Board of School Commissioners for the City of
Dartmouth, Garnishee (1970), 12 D.L.R. (3d) 404, at 408
38. Coutts, supra note 24, at 61. Many U.S.A. jurisdictions treat mental
incompetency as only one evidential factor in establishing mental incapacity on the
grounds that it is conclusive only of the mental incompetent's state of mind at the
time of the proceeding and that the proceeding is not in rem ("Mental Illness and
Contracts", supra note 32, at 1043-1044.)
39. Dependent Adults Act, S.A. 1976, c. 63, ss. 33, 34, 52, as am. [Public
Trustee]; Patients' Estate Act, S.B.C. 1962, c. 44, s. 7, as am. by S.B.C. 1964, c.
36, s. 3; S.B.C. 1976, c. 33, s. 104 [Public Trustee]; Mental Health Act, R.S.N.B.
1973, c. M-10, ss. 36, 37, as am. by S.N.B. 1979, c. 41, subs. 80(3)
[Administrator of Estates]; Public Trustee Act, S.N.S. 1973, c. 12, ss. 4, 5, 7, as
am. by S.N.S. 1976, c. 16, ss. 17, 18 [Public Trustee]; The Mental Health Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 269, ss. 32-34, as am. by S.O. 1978, c. 50, s. 13 [Public Trustee];
The Administration of Estates of Mentally Disordered Persons Act, R.S.S. 1965, c.
347, s. 4, as am. [Administrator of Estates]
40. Dependent Adults Act, S.A. 1976, c. 63, ss. 26, 52, as am. by S.A. 1977, c.
93, subs. 2 (3) [Trustee]; Patients' Estate Act, S.B.C. 1962, c. 44, ss. 7, 10, 14, as
am. by S.B.C. 1964, c. 36, ss. 3, 7; S.B.C. 1965, c. 32, s. 5 S.B.C. 1976, c. 33,
s. 104 [committee]; Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-8, ss. 3, 10, as am.
by S.N.B. 1979, c. 41, subs. 66 (2) and Mental Health Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.
M-10, ss. 36, 37, as am. by S.N.B. 1979, c. 41, subs. 80(3) [committee];
Incompetent Persons Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 135, subs. 2(2), as am. [guardian];
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appointed to manage the estate of a person declared incompetent to
do so. From this function of the court-appointed body stems the
theory that contracts of the mentally incompetent which purport to
dispose of his property will not bind him or his estate since they
would interfere with the court's control of his property. 41 As long as
the formal order remains the mental incompetent is incapable of
entering into such contracts, 42 but such a contract would bind the
other party.
43
The extent to which an adjudgement of incompetency would
affect a contract of employment is debatable. Although some assert
that the doctrine is restricted to contracts for the disposal of
property, two arguments support its extension to the employment
contract. First, all contracts create a potential liability to pay
damages and therefore necessarily interfere with the court's control
of the property. Second, if it is accepted that incompetency
proceedings are in rem, the employer will be deemed to have notice
of the incompetent's incapacity to contract; he will be prevented
from instituting proceedings to have the contract terminated, 44 and
any mentally incompetent employee who is attempting to have the
contract terminated need not prove the second requirement (the
employer's actual knowledge).
Although people may be found mentally incompetent for a
variety of reasons this area of tle law is of particular relevance to
the mentally ill. While admittance to a psychiatric institution does
not mean that the patient's estate is automatically managed by a
guardian, it does precipitate an investigation into incompetency.
The Hospitals Act requires an "examination of a person in a
hospital by a psychiatrist to determine whether or not that person is
competent to administer his estate", lists the criteria that the
psychiatrist must consider and provides a procedure for initiating,
where necessary, the appointment of the Public Trustee.4 5 Statutes
The Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 269, subs. 33(2), as am. by S.O. 1978, c.
50, s. 13 and The Mental Incompetency Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 271, s. 12
[committee]; The Administration of Estates of Mentally Disordered Persons Act,
R.S.S. 1965, c. 347, ss. 4, 10, as am. and The Mentally Disordered Persons Act,
R.S.S. 1965, c. 346, as am. by S.S. 1972, c. 71 [committee]
41. Rourke v. Halford (1916), 31 D.L.R. 371, at 376, 10 O.W.N. 217, at 217-218
(Ont. S.C., A.D.) followingRe Walker [1905] 1 Ch. 160
42. Id.
43. Baldwyn v. Smith, [1900] 1 Ch. 588
44. Coutts, supra note 24, at 62; 14 Col. L. Rev. 675 (1914)
45. Hospitals Act, supra note 31, as am. by S.N.S. 1977, c. 45, ss. 1, 8; N.S.
Reg. 16/79, R.N.S. Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 38
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of other jurisdictions have similar provisions. 46
Another relevant provision is subs. 8 (4) of the Public Trustee
Act 47 under which a patient who is not incompetent may agree to
have the Public Trustee act as a guardian of his estate while he is in
a psychiatric facility. Can such a person make contracts which
interfere with this guardianship? It is submitted that as he has never
been found incapable of managing his affairs he probably can.
However, with the rare exception of the patient who has not
terminated the agreement but, because he is almost ready for
discharge, is allowed to obtain regular employment while living at
the institution, 48 this will not be a practical problem.
B. Intervening Insanity
Insanity occurring between the time of the making of the offer and
the acceptance of the offer may be a ground for holding that there
was no contract. The basic rationale behind the rule is that the
insanity is equated with death and that supervening death of the
offeror or offeree will make acceptance impossible. The relevancy
of this doctrine to employment law is limited because, with the
exception of unilateral offers, the period of time between the
making and the acceptance of the offer of employment is normally
short. It may, however, be worth arguing where the party wishing to
escape the contract cannot meet the more stringent tests necessary to
have the contract terminated on the ground of inability to contract at
the time of the offer. As the employee may be either offeror or
offeree the law appropriate to both offeror and offeree in the context
of the employment contract will be considered.
The law will prevent a person with knowledge of another's
supervening insanity from acting as if he was not so aware, in the
case of the offeree, accepting the offer and in the case of the offeror,
treating the acceptance as binding. The crux of the matter then is the
effect of supervening insanity of which the other party is unaware.
In general the law is not interested in the actual state of a person's
mind. However, it is argued that the destruction of the offeree or the
offeree's mind will frustrate the intention to contract, as "an offer,
unless made to the public at large, assumes the continued existence
46. See notes 30 and 31
47. S.N.S. 1973, c. 12
4&, Laurie Webber, Industrial Therapy Co-ordinator at Abbie J. Lane Memorial
Hospital stated that approximately 2 out of 120 patients were so employed.
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of a particular offeree". 49 Of more relevance to employment
contracts, where the continued sanity of the offeror or offeree is
normally assumed to be a vital condition of the contract, is the
theory that for such contracts the offeror's supervening insanity will
revoke the offer and the offeree's supervening insanity will prevent
him from accepting. For this reason in an employment contract, if
intervening insanity can be proved, it will be a cogent argument.,50
C. Summary
It is apparent from this brief survey of the capacity of the mentally
handicapped to contract, that the common law is in a confused state.
In this area the application of contractual theories to the
employment contract seems particularly artificial and strained.
Although the actual decisions seem to provide a just balance
between the conflicting policies of protection of the mentally
handicapped and stability of transactions, 51 they have resulted in
theoretical illogicalities.
The requirement that the other contracting party know of the
incapacity is criticized on both subjective and objective grounds:
subjective theorists argue that even without it there is no consensus
ad idem and objective theorists argue that lack of capacity to
contract, without more, should be sufficient to vitiate the contract. 52
There are, however, less abstract grounds for criticizing the law.
The test for determining the existence of mental incapacity is
whether there was mental incapacity to such a degree as would
prevent the party from substantially understanding the nature and
effect of the transaction into which he was entering.s5 The
compartmentalized view of a person's mind involved in looking to
the understanding requisite for a particular transaction is based on
outmoded psychiatric views, not the modem conception of man as a
totality. 54 Further, the traditional "understanding" test does not
49. Cheshire and Fifoot (9th ed., ed. M.P. Furmston, London; Butterworths,
1976), at 57
50. Coutts, supra note 24, at 58-60
51. Id., at 74-75; "Mental Illness and Contracts", supra note 32, at 1025-1026,
1082
52. Brown, supra note 14, at 600-602, 613
53. Corkum, by her Guardian, Montreal Trust Company and Douglas v. The Nova
Scotia Trust Company, supra note 21, at 262
54. R. D. Cotton, "Agreements of the Mentally Disabled: A Problem of New
Jersey Law" (1971), 3 Rutgers Camden L. J. 241, at 252
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provide relief for one who intellectually understands the transaction
but who lacks effective control of his conduct.
55
By requiring an incompetent's lack of understanding to have been
known to the other party the common law favours the security of
transactions at the expense of the protection of the mentally weak.
As a further demonstration of inconsistency it must be noted that
this requirement is not imposed upon infants, even those who
appear to be of legal age.56 One author has made the following
incisive comment on the discrepancy:
Inasmuch as the policy of the law of England is to protect infants,
on the ground of their immaturity of reason, much more is it to be
expected that the law would protect lunatics who have no reason
at all, especially when it is recollected that in no other legal
system is the principle of protecting infants carried to such an
extreme extent as is done in English Law.
5 7
The policy of the law appears to have been enunciated by
Bramwell, L. J. when he stated that "it must be recollected that
insanity is not a privilege, it is a misfortune, which must not be
allowed to injure innocent persons." 5 8 On these grounds, infancy,
in marked contrast, appears to be a privilege that entitles infants to
demand sacrifices from the rest of society.
One commentator has proposed a radical overhaul of this whole
area of law and institution of an insurance or bankruptcy scheme to
distribute the losses. 5 9 It would seem more realistic to ask the
legislature to rationalize and codify the law.
Generally, as the mental ability of the employee is normally
essential to the performance of the contract of service and the courts
will only declare a person mentally incapable in cases of serious
disorder, it is his mental ability to perform the contract, not the
technical legal problem of the formation of employment contracts
by the mentally incapable, which controls the relationship.
55. Two authors state that this may have been modified in the U.S.A. L. G.
Kowalski, "Contracts - Competency to Contract of a Mentally Ill Person Who
Fully Understands Transaction but is Unable to Control Conduct" (1970), 16
Wayne L. Rev. 1188 citing Ortelere v. Teacher's Retirement Board, 25 N.Y. 2d
196, 250 N.E, 2d 460, 303 N.Y.S. 2d 362 (1969); E. Hall, "Contracts - Mental
Capacity - The Ability to Exercise Will is an Element of Mental Capacity"
(1975), 6 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1147 citing Nohra v. Evans 509 S.W. 2d 648 (Tex.
Civ. App. Austin 1974; no writ).
56. Cook, supra note 17, at 439
57. Id.
58. Drew v. Nunn (1879), 4 Q.B.D. 661, at 668
59. Cotton, supra note 54, at 270-271
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III. Rights and Duties of the Mentally Handicapped Employee
Once a party has formed a legally binding contract his mental ability
to understand the transaction goes only to his ability to perform
according to the terms. Where performance need not be personal the
guardian of the mentally handicapped may complete the transaction
but in an employment contract performance by the party himself is
understood to be essential. At common law mental impairment may
be sufficiently debilitating to cause the contract to be automatically
terminated under the doctrine of frustration or to provide "just
cause" for the employer to summarily dismiss the employee for
breach of condition or wrongful repudiation. Otherwise the
employer must give the employee the requisite notice of termination
and failure to do so will give rise to an action for wrongful
dismissal. The common law has, however, been supplemented in
most jurisdictions by legislation 60 which provides statutory relief if
certain minimum requirements are not observed. While such
legislation does not abrogate the employee's rights at common law,
it may exempt the employer from compliance with the notice
requirement if the contract is terminated due to just cause61 or
frustration,6 2 as it may well be if a person's mental handicap is
60. Board of Industrial Relations, Order No. 61 (1975) Governing Notice of
Termination of Employment made under authority of The Alberta Labour Act,
1973, Alta. Reg. 53/76; The Employment Standards Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-l 10,
ss. 35, 35.1, as cm. by S.M. 1972, c. 52, ss. 4, 5; S.M. 1977, c. 56, ss. 3-7; S.M.
1976, c. 33, s. 4; The Labour Standards Act, S.N. 1977, c. 52, ss. 47-54; Labour
Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, ss. 67-74, as am. by S.N.S. 1975, c. 50, ss.
4, 5: S.N.S. 1976, c. 41, ss. 15-17; The Employment Standards Act, 1974, S.O.
1974, c. I t2, s. 40, as am.; Labour Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. L-1, s. 79, as am.;
The Labour Standards Act, 1977, S.S. 1976-77, c. 36, s. 43, as am.; Canada
Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, ss. 60.4 - 60.8, as am.; Quebec Civil Code,
Art. 1668
61. Board of Industrial Relations, Order No. 61(1975) Governing Notice of
Termination of Employment made under authority of The Alberta Labour Act,
1973, Alta. Reg. 53/76, subs. 2(c); The Employment Standards Act, R.S.M. 1970,
c. E-110 subs. 35(10), 35.1(2) (c), as am. by S.M. 1976, c. 33, s. 4; The Labour
Standards Act, S.N. 1977, c. 52, subs. 49(1) (a); The Labour Standards Code,
S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 68 (1), as am.; The Employment Standards Act, 1974, S.O.
1974, c. 112, subs. 40(3) (c), as am.; Labour Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. L-I, subs.
79 (1), as am.; The Labour Standards Act, 1977, S.S. 1976-77, c. 36, subs. 43(a),
as am.; Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 60.4 as am.
62. Statutory definitions of frustration due to mental handicap are: Board of
Industrial Relations, Order No. 61(1975) Governing Notice of Termination of
Employment made under Authority of The Alberta Labour Act, 1973, Alta. Reg.
53/76, subs. 2(j); The Employment Standards Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-110, subs.
35.1(2) (d), as am.; The Employment Standards Act, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112,
subs. 40(3) (d), as am.; Quebec Civil Code, Art. 1668.
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debilitating. Legislation governing the employment relationship
specially affects the mentally handicapped in another way; it will
generally allow an employer to pay a handicapped employee below
the minimum wage if he has the specific permission of the
Minimum Wage Board.
A. Payment Below the Minimum Wage
In all jurisdictions except Quebec, an employer may pay an
employee with a mental or physical handicap below the minimum
wage if he has the specific permission of the administrators. 63 This
provision is presumably designed to enable a "handicapped person
to be gainfully employed." 64 However valid this desire, an
exemption from this basic right of employment is only theoretically
and morally acceptable if, as required by section 16 of The
Construction Industry Wages Act of Manitoba, 65 it is based upon a
finding that the work of the handicapped person is less valuable than
that of the average employee. Administrators of services such as the
Adult Services Center in Halifax think it important that a mentally
handicapped person find employment that he is capable of
63. Legislation which allows a handicapped employee to be paid below the
minimum wage is: The Alberta Labour Act, 1973, S.A. 1973, c. 33, subs. 32(3)
("where an employee is handicapped"); General Minimum Wage Order,
Minimum Wage Order 1 (1975), B.C. Reg. 724/75 subs. 2(2) which refers to the
Minimum Wage Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 230, s. 7, as am. by S.B.C. 1976, c. 32,
s. 13A ("employee classified by the Board as handicapped"); Employment
Standards Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-110, s. 13 ("handicapped employee");
Regulation Respecting Minimum Wages and Wages Working Conditions under the
Employment Standards Act, M.R.R. 1971, Reg. E-110-RI, subs. 5(l), as am.
("employee's physical or mental handicap"); The Construction Industry Wages
Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. C190, s. 16, as am., ("an employee who because of mental
or physical disability is unable (a) to perform all work usually performed by
employees in the class of employees within which he falls; or (b) to perform such
work with as much skill as those other employees"); Minimum Wage Act,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-13, subs. 8(2) ("handicapped... employees"); The Labour
Standards Act, S.N. 1977, c. 52, s. 29 ("handicapped employees"); Minimum
Wage Order General N.S. Reg. 84/77, R.N.S. Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 53, s. 14; Labour
Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c. 52, subs. 48(3) ("employee who is
handicapped"); The Employment Standards Act, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112, s. 24, as
am. ("handicapped person"); Order No. 2-78 made pursuant to Labour Act, P.E.I.
Reg. No. EC894/78, s. 8 ("handicapped person"); The Labour Standards Act,
S.S., 1976-77, c. 36, s. 16, as am. ("handicapped employee"); Canada Labour
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 37, as am. ("handicapped person").
64. The Employment Standards Act, 1974, c. 112, s. 24, as am.; Labour Act,
R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. L-1, subs. 63(6), as am.; Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970,
c. L-1, subs. 37(1), as am.
65. R.S.M. 1970, c. C 190, as am.
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performing so that he will not be deprived of his right to the
minimum wage. 
66
In Nova Scotia the large majority of current permissions were
granted due to mental handicaps. 6 7 As the Minimum Wage Board
wishes to avoid difficult issues such as whether mental illness
prevents a person from adequately performing the job, they have
granted the permission if the person has had a history of mental
retardation which has been determined by seeing whether the person
has received services designed for the mentally retarded. While the
Board sets a wage as close to the minimum wage as possible 68 and
permission has been infrequently granted, this provision and its
application are still of concern. First, mental retardation does not
per se establish a person's inability to perform and, in particular, the
Board should not decide the issue by whether or not a person has
been labelled as mentally retarded. Second, although the Board tries
to update the permissions, there is no provision for a review
procedure, and a handicapped employee may well learn to perform
the job after a period of time which is perhaps lengthier than
normal. Third, it can be argued that the mere existence of such a
provision encourages a paternalistic attitude to the handicapped; in
today's competitive market it would probably be better for all
concerned if such persons are employed in jobs which they are
capable of performing with adequate training.
These criticisms apparently apply to all jurisdictions as none
prescribe a review procedure, the stipulations in The Manitoba
Construction Industry Wages Act are unique, and pragmatic
considerations probably cause all administrators to use criteria
similar to those used by Nova Scotia's Minimum Wage Board.
B. Summary Dismissal
There has been a recent tendency to restrict the right of employers to
summarily dismiss their employees. The courts have restricted the
doctrine by applying the general common law principles of
repudiation and breach of condition to the traditional categories of
conduct for which summary dismissal is justified. 69 A mental
66. Sandy Leim, Work Procurement Officer at the Adult Services Centre
67. A binder, at the Labour Standards Division, containing these permissions
disclosed that out of fifteen such permissions, ten were based solely on mental
handicap.
68. Mr. Ross Mitchell, Director of Labour Standards Division
69. Freedland, supra note 13, at 194
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handicap may cause behaviour falling into any one of these
categories (neglect and disobedience, misconduct, incompetence,
illness and disability) and it is a question of fact whether it will
justify summary dismissal. In determining the question the courts
will examine the nature and terms of the contract, the severity of the
handicap and the length of the handicap.
7-0
It is important to realize that a mentally handicapped person's
inability to perform a job may be caused not so much by a lack of a
certain level of vocational skills or by him being forced to stay at
home due to illness but to his inability to conform to the general
employment situation. For instance, due to a lack of basic living and
social skills he may find it difficult to follow orders, be regular and
punctual in attendance, co-operate with fellow employees. 71 These
problems are not, of course, generic to all the mentally handicapped
and they are not entirely internal; they are often caused by the
attitudes of fellow employees to someone who is obviously
"different", or by the pressures of work. The importance of this
perception lies in understanding that a mentally handicapped
employee's behaviour may fall into any one of the traditional
categories of conduct justifying summary dismissal, not just illness
or incompetence.
In deciding whether dismissal is justified the courts will take into
account the causes of the employee's actions. No employer is
entitled to expect 100 percent performance from his employee at all
times. If an employee's erratic behaviour is due to his difficulty in
coping with the pressures of work and his environment, the
employer should and probably will be expected to take this into
account, particularly if the employee has a long history of reliability
and ability.
72
In practice, issues relating to summary dismissal are probably of
greater relevance to employees who become mentally ill than to the
retarded, who generally have "good" work records. 73 In either case
70. Batt, The Law of Master and Servant, at 82-100, (5th ed., ed. G. Walker,
London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1967)
71. See Part VII, para. 2
72. Robinson v. Canadian Acceptance Corp. Ltd. (1973) 43 D.L.R. (3d) 301 aff'd
(1974) 47 D.L.R. (3d) 417 (N.S.S.C.A.D.), at 309. Rivest v. Canfarge Ltd.,
S1977) 4 W.W.R. 515 (Alta. S.C.T.D.), at 520-521
73. Honourable Bud Cullen, Minister, Department of Manpower and Immigration
appearing as a panel member in "Proceedings of the Seminar on the Employability
3f the Handicapped" (Toronto, 1976) published by Social Services Division,
Department of National Health and Welfare in 1977, at 62
274 The Dalhousie Law Journal
where there is no element of fraud on the part of the employee the
courts will probably be slow to find him to be at fault. 74 The
employee who would not have been employed if he had not lied
about his psychiatric history may, however, be held to be guilty of
fraud and have difficulty obtaining the sympathy of the court,
especially if full disclosure on the employment application is
considered a condition of employment.
75
C. Frustration
A party can successfully allege that a contract is terminated due to
frustration if it appears that the "employee's incapacity, looked at
before the purported dismissal, [was] of such a nature, or did...
appear likely to continue for such a period, that further
performances of obligations in the future would either be impossible
or would be a thing radically different from that [agreed upon]" 76
and if he is not at fault.
The most common cause of inability of the employee to perform
is permanent disabling illness, 77 or injury. It would seem logical to
extend the principles enunciated in the cases on physical illness to
mental handicaps, particularly mental illness. The leading case of
Marshall v. Harland and Wolff Ltd. 78 indicates that in deciding this
question of fact the court was unwilling "to concede a wide scope to
the doctrine of frustration in the context of employment." The five
factors that they considered in applying the doctrine tend to militate
against frustration in the case of the reasonably well established
employee employed for an indefinite period terminable by notice. 79
This approach attempts to preserve the employee's right to due
notice where he has a vested interest in the job.
The party alleging termination on the basis of frustration must not
have deliberately, or perhaps, negligently 80 induced the frustrating
event. The issue will not often arise as normally the employer will
be the one seeking to have the contract terminated, and he cannot be
reasonably accused of inducing an employee's mental handicap.
74. Freedland, supra note 13, at 200-202
75. Id., at 206-208
76. Marshall v. Harland and Wolff Ltd., (1972] I.C.R. 101, at 106; [1972] 1
W.L.R. 899, at 903
77. The Dartmouth Ferry Commission v. Marks (1904), 34 S.C.R. 366
78. Supra note 76
79. Freedland, supra note 13, at 309, discussing Marshall v. Harland and Wolff
Ltd., supra note 76.
80. Id., at 321-322
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However, on the infrequent occasions where it is the employee who
is alleging frustration of the contract there may be a problem if his
employer can successfully prove that the employee should have
foreseen the frustrating event. This is particularly relevant to those
who have some history of psychiatric disorder. While it seems
unreasonable to require disclosure of an isolated nervous break-
down, particularly as it may hinder chances of obtaining
employment, if there is a pattern of disability which might be
reasonably expected to affect his performance and the person lies
about this, the frustrating event may be termed self-induced. Apart
from the question of foreseeability at the time of the agreement, it is
a difficult question of fact whether the frustrating event may be
termed self-induced if the undue consumption of alcohol or drugs
contributed to it.
IV. Job Related Social Welfare Rights of the Mentally Handicap-
ped
A. Rights of the Employee Upon Termination
Unless the contract of employment is declared void its termination
may entitle the employee to certain rights, whether it is terminated
because of incapacity to contract at the time of the offer, frustration
or just cause. He will probably not be eligible for Workmen's
Compensation as the right to compensation is confined to personal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. 8 1
While the word "accident" is given a liberal interpretation by the
Workmen's Compensation Board of Nova Scotia, it will be difficult
to prove that the employment caused, wholly or in part, the mental
handicap.8 2 However, under the Unemployment Insurance Act,
1971, a disabled person can receive the initial benefits if he has the
81. The Worker's Compensation Act, S.A. 1973, c. 87, subs. 16(1); Workmen's
Compensation Act, S.B.C. 1968, c. 59, subs 6(1), as am. S.B.C. 1972, c. 64,
subs. 4(a); The Workers Compensation Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. W200, subs. 4(1), as
am. S.M. 1974, c. 49, s. 1; Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.
W-13, subs. 7(1); The Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 403, subs.
6(1); Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 343, subs. 7(l), as am.
S.N.S. 1968, c. 65; The Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 505,
subs. 3(1), as am. S.O. 1973, c. 173, s. 1; Worker's Compensation Act,
R.S.P.E.I., 1974, c. W-10, subs. 6(l), as am. S.P.E.I. 1976, c. 34, s. 1; The
Worker's Compensation Act, 1974, S.S. 1973-74, c. 127, subs. 31(1)
82. Mr. Nelson, Assistant Director of Claims, Workmen's Compensation Board of
Nova Scotia, has seen only one such claim. It was refused because causation could
not be proved. The Quebec provisions, while slightly broader, still require
causation to be proved [Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 159, subs.
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requisite number of insurable weeks and is not working by reason of
"prescribed illness, injury or quarantine. '"83 Illness has been
interpreted as including both physical and emotional illness.8 4 After
a maximum of fifteen weeks the person's benefits will expire 5 and
unless he has become "capable and available" for work he cannot
receive extended benefits. 86 Until a recent legislative clarification,
the prohibition against an inmate of an institution "supported
wholly or partly out of public funds" 87 receiving sickness benefits,
while aimed at prison inmates, could have included inmates of
facilities available to the mentally retarded 88 or mentally ill.
The Canada Pension Plan entitles a person who is "suffering
from a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability" 89 to
receive a disability pension if he has made the required
contributions for the minimum qualifying period. A person is not
disabled within the meaning of the Act if he is able to regularly
pursue any substantially gainful occupation. 90 Payments of the
disability pension are based on a small flat rate, plus primarily, 75
percent of the amount of the contributor's retirement pension.9'
They do not begin until the fourth month following the month in
which the applicant became disabled. 92 A claim for benefits may be
made on behalf of a disabled contributor's child.
B. Modification by Contract
In determining the rights of the employee individual employment
contracts are frequently far more relevant than the common law.
While the contract will not jeopardize his minimum statutory rights,
in large companies there are intricate benefit plans that provide for
3(l), as am. S.Q. 1969, c. 52, s. 1] As of December, 1978, neither this nor any of
the provisions in footnote 81 had been judicially considered.
83. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, subs. 25(b) as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 80, s. 7;
S.C. 1976-77, c. 54, s. 36
84. Judy Whitman, Public Liaison Officer, Unemployment Insurance Commission
of Canada, Halifax
85. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, subs. 22(3) as am. by S.C. 1976-77, c. 54, s. 34
86. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 36 as am. by S.C. 1976-77, c. 54, s. 41
87. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 45 as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 80, s. 17
88. B. B. Swadron, Mental Retardation - The Law-Guardianship (Toronto:
National Institute on Mental Retardation), at 74
89. Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-5, subs. 43(2), as am.
90. Id., Mr. Tom Weir, District Manager, Halifax District Office, Income
Security Program
91. Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-5, subs. 54 (1), as am.
92. Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-5, s. 70, as am. by S. C.
1974-75-76, c. 4, s. 35
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almost every eventuality that may befall the employee. The terms of
these plans may vary from company to company but their essence is
generally the same.
Two of these plans (sick leave and long term disability) are of
particular concern to the mentally handicapped employee who is no
longer able to perform his job. A survey of seven major firms in the
Metropolitan area revealed that all those questioned on the point9 3
had group insurance for their employees which included a sickness
plan and long term disability plan with provisions contemplating
eligibility due to mental handicap, normally mental illness. The
eligibility requirements varied from company to company and were
determined by the length of the employee's illness/disability. For
the first few months of illness the company would pay the sick
(physically, mentally or emotionally) employee part of his salary.
After this period, the employee would be eligible for long term
disability benefits which would be paid by the insurance company
who administered the scheme. All plans required, at the minimum,
a physician's statement that the employee was unable to perform his
job. After two years a more stringent test was applied. All but two
of the plans demanded that the employee's handicap prevented him
not only from performing his own job but any job at all. The
remaining two stopped payments unless the employee was
hospitalized. The length and the amount of benefits payable varied
but frequent determinants were the employee's salary and his length
of service.
If a person is receiving monies under a long term disability plan,
he will still be eligible to receive the full benefits under the Canada
Pension Plan as eligibility is based on contribution, not need. 94
However, if the insurance company's payments are classified as
earnings his benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act will
be reduced. 95 The effect of these payments on provincial and
municipal assistance will be discussed in the next section.
An employee of a large company will frequently have far greater
93. Over the period of February 9, 1979 to March 9, 1979 I questioned Benefit
Plan Officers of Dalhousie University, Maritime Tel andTel, Volvo Canada Ltd.,
and Nova Scotia Power Corporation on the sickness and long term disability plans
available to their employees, and Maritime Life Assurance Co., National Sea
Products Ltd. and H. H. Marshall Ltd. on just the long, term disability pban
available to their employees.
94. Tom Weir, supra note 90
95. Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, subs. 29(4), as
am.
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rights than those granted to him by common law or by statute. The
fact that the benefits are influenced by length of service and salary is
consistent with the view of a job as a valuable asset. The major
criticism is that the requirement of hospitalization is unnecessarily
restrictive.
C. Provincial and Municipal Social Assistance
Persons who are unemployed due to a mental handicap are but one
of many classes of people who may be eligible to receive provincial
assistance designed for those with needs of a prolonged nature96
and/or municipal assistance, which is intended to be short-term or
supplementary. 97 Current statistics indicate that the mentally
handicapped are a significant client group of the City of Halifax 98
and particularly, the Province of Nova Scotia. 99 The substantial cost
of the assistance is not borne totally by the level of government
which administers the program. 100
96. Family Benefits Act, S.N.S. 1977, c. 8, s. 3
97. Mr. Stewart, Social Assistance Administrator, City of Halifax; these aims are
made clear by the policy, procedure and forms in the "Metropolitan Halifax
Regional Municipal Social Services: Policy, Procedure and Information Manual",
effective June 1, 1977, as am. (hereinafter referred to as "Halifax Social Services
Manual"), parts 1.2.3, 1.2.3.1, r.2.4,1.2.6,1.2.6.4,1.2.8,1.2.15.
98. The data, obtained from Municipal Social Assistance Statistics, City of
Halifax Social Planning and Recreation Department, for May 1979 is as follows:
Mental Health Physical Health
Total Short Term Long Term Short Term Long Term
No. of Cases 1,118 86 44 145 138
Cost $249,100 $15,092 $7,939 $36,145 $24,285
The "Halifax Social Services Manual", Id., part 1.2..15.1 defines short term
mental health as "a mental condition which prevents the client from being
employable for a period diagnosed to be less than 6 months" and long term mental
health as "a mental condition which prevents the client from being employable for
a period diagnosed to be in excess of 6 months". The definitions of short term
physical health and long term physical health correspond.
99. In June 1979, of the $4,7000,000. paid to a total caseload of 18,661,
$2,100,000. was paid to a caseload of 10,109 disabled (which Family Benefits
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2 No. 5 p. 109, subs, 4(g), as am.,
defines as "unemployable by reason of having a major physical or mental
impairment or a combination of mental impairment and physical impairment that is
likely to continue for at least twelve months.") If the ratio of physical health to
mental health cases is the same as the municipal ratio then the mental health
caseload is approximately 4,650. Data obtained from Mr. Gorsline Chief
Supervisor of Family Benefits, Social Services Department, Province of Nova
Scotia.
100. Mr. Stewart, supra note 97, stated that the provincial government reimburses
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Mentally handicapped persons who wish to receive provincial or
municipal assistance must meet several requirements before they are
eligible. They must provide medical proof of disability' 0 ' and
exhaust all other feasible sources of income. 10 2 Payments for
disability from sources such as Unemployment Insurance Commis-
sion, Canada Pension Plan, Workmen's Compensation and
insurance companies will be charged as income at 100 percent and
will be used in calculating the budget deficit, if any.103 The
municipality will also charge Provincial Social Assistance payments
at 100 percent.' 04 The budget deficit is used in determining a
person's benefits. 1
0 5
There are certain rules and regulations which are likely to
particularly affect the mentally handicapped. These include:
requirements that the client be willing to participate in vocational
rehabilitation in order to remain eligible for assistance; 10 6
provisions resulting in the client losing most of his benefits if he is a
patient in a hospital;1 7 provisions for the appointment of a trustee
the City of Halifax for 75% of its expenditure and the federal government
reimburses the provincial government for 50% of its expenditure. The authority for
these arrangements is under, respectively, Social Assistance Act, S.N.S. 1970, c.
16, subs. 32, 33(c), as am. and Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-I, as
am.
101. "Halifax Social Services Manual", supra note 97, parts 1.2.8., 1.2.15.,
Family Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2 No. 5, p. 109, subs.
7(g), 8(g), as am.
102. "Halifax Social Services Manual" id., parts 1.2.8., 1.2.15; Family Benefits
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 109, subs. 9 (2), as am.
103. "Halifax Social Services Manual", id., parts 1.2.4, 1.2.6; Family Benefits
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 109, subs. 4(n), 35(2) (g),
as am.
104. "Halifax Social Services Manual", id., parts 1.2.6, 1.2.6.4
105. This is the sole criterion for the municipality ("Halifax Social Services
Manual", ibid., parts 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.4.1, 1.2.4.2.; Mr. Stewart, supra note 97].
However the province will only pay the disabled person his budget deficit if this is
less than the maximum benefits. [Family Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78,
R.N.S. Vol. 2, No 5, p. 109, subs. 18(2), 18(8), as am.].
106. "Halifax Social Services Manual", id., part 1.2.15; Family Benefits
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 109, subs. 13(2), as am.
107. The reason that municipal assistance recipients will not receive their benefits
is not that they are ineligible, but that their only expenses are personal ones. [Mr.
Stewart, supra note 97]. For this they receive a comfort allowance of $20.00.
["Halifax Social Services Manual", id., part 1.3.21.8]. Provincial social
assistance recipients become ineligible at the Director's discretion. [Family
Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 109, subs. I 1(1),
as am.]. This discretion allows him to grant a comfort allowance of $40.00 or pay
for a patient's continuing obligations, e.g. his family's continuing needs if the
patient is the head of the household. [Mr. Gorsline, supra note 991.
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to administer the assistance for the benefit of the client if he has
demonstrated that he is not able to manage it.108 A mentally
handicapped person's vocational rehabilitation will probably be
influenced by incentive programs and the methods for determining
income and eligibility as these will affect the financial "rewards"
received for progressing along the path to independence. These
effects will be discussed later.
D. Summary
It is clear that to an employee who becomes substantially affected
by a mental handicap, the most important rights are not the rights to
wages or temporary unemployment insurance benefits, but the
continuing benefits arising from disability, whether based upon
contribution or need. Provincial and municipal assistance will
probably not be of concern to the former employee of a large
company but are of crucial importance to those who were never
employed, and to former employees of smaller companies which
could not afford comprehensive benefit schemes.
V. The Right to Equality of Opportunity
The mentally handicapped person's lack'of self-confidence, and of
employment and socialization skills, means that he has enough
problems finding jobs without having to contend with discrimina-
tion. However he is likely to encounter discrimination from
employers because of prejudice or, more likely, misconceptions.
Few employers actively practice a policy of discrimination
against the mentally handicapped. Even if they did, it would be hard
to identify as they could often justify not hiring the person on the
basis of lack of qualifications, as long as the qualifications required
were not too outrageously high. 10 9 It is more common to discover
that the reason for not hiring a mentally handicapped person who
appears capable of performing the job is the fear that the individual
will disrupt the work situation because he is accident-prone,"10
cannot co-operate with his fellow employees,"' or, in the case of
108. "Halifax Social Services Manual", id., part 1.2.20; Mr. Stewart, supra note
97; Family Benefits Act, S.N.S. 1977, c. 8, s. 10; Family Benefits Regulation,
N.S. Reg. 50178, R.N.S. Vol. 2 No. 5, p. 109, s. 40, as am,
109. Ed Russell, Information Officer at the Nova Scotia Human Rights
Commission
110. B. B. Swadron, supra note 88, at 72-73
111. Laurie Webber, supra note 48
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the post-mentally ill, cannot cope with responsibility. 1 12 It is a
question of fact whether there is a valid basis for these fears, but
frequently they will be caused by misunderstanding rather than a
true appreciation of the situation.
However bona fide the beliefs and actions of the employer, the
mentally handicapped person is justified in believing that he suffers
from stigmatization. The post-mentally ill person may respond to
the situation by attempting to hide his illness. This is a dangerous
game to play; if discovered it may give the employer the right to
summary dismissal and will probably result in an uncomfortable
work relationship. All too often the reaction of both the
post-mentally ill and the mentally retarded is simply not to actively
seek jobs.
"Tools" especially suited to combatting this particular effect of
the public's attitude to the mentally handicapped include union
pressure, affirmative action programs aiming to reduce qualification
standards that are too high, government programs providing
economic incentives for introducing the mentally handicapped into
competitive work situations,"13 increased use of on-the-job training
and human rights legislation, which is an important means of
protecting the rights of any minority group. While the legislation's
effectiveness depends upon the vigour with which it is enforced and
the public's acceptance of the protected right, it does provide a
means for formal enforcement.
At present the rights of the mentally handicapped are not
entrenched in any human rights legislation in Canada. The Nova
Scotia Human Rights Commission, however, accepts complaints
and attempts to deal with them on an informal basis, with varying
degrees of success." 4 In 1978 they accepted twenty such
complaints, most of them concerning employment and some of
112. Mental Disorder and the Law: A Report of an Advanced Seminar in
Criminology (ed. C. Kerfoot) (Vancouver: Centre for Continuing Education,
University of British Columbia, 1974), at 38
113. An example of such a program is Canada Manpower Industrial Training
Program (hereinafter referred to as CMITP). For a discussion of the program see
note 155a. It was suggested by Dr. Rocher, panel member, in "Proceedings of the
Seminar on the Employability of the Handicapped", supra note 73, at 41-42 that
such a system is preferable to a quota system (such as the one proposed in Special
Report to Parliament incorporating recommendations from the National
Conference "Human Rights in Canada, The Years Ahead" held in Ottawa, Dec.
8-9-10, 1978" (January, 1979. Canadian Human Rights Commission) at 10
(hereinafter referred to as "Human Rights Report").
114. Ed. Russell, supra note 109
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them not legitimate."1 5 The Federal Human Rights Commission has
not yet received a complaint but is prepared to deal with it on an
informal "good office basis."116 It has been suggested that in those
jurisdictions which have prohibited discrimination in employment
on the basis of physical handicap 17 most complaints by the
mentally handicapped regarding employment could be treated on a
formal basis by giving a broad interpretation to the words "physical
handicap".8 Although the New Brunswick Human Rights
Commission takes that approach, 1 9 to date the administrators of the
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act have felt that political constraints
prevented them from classifying mental handicaps with a physical
basis, such as schizophrenia (chemical) and Downs Syndrome (birth
defect), as physical handicaps. 1
20
There is a strong movement afoot to include mental handicap
within human rights legislation in Canada to bring it into accord
with the international human rights covenants that Canada has
ratified.' 2 1 Until this occurs Canadian human rights commissions
will have to continue with their present methods of statutory
interpretation and affirmative action programs' 22 as the means of
enforcing the mentally handicapped person's right to be eligible for
employment which he is capable of performing.
115. Examination of the records by Leslie Dolan, librarian at the Nova Scotia
Human Rights Commission
116. Statement by Gordon Fairweather, Chief Commissioner, Canadian Human
Rights Commission, in a letter contained in a file entitled "Mental Handicap-
General", in the federal Human Rights Commission office in Halifax.
117. The Human Rights Act, S.M. 1974, c. 65, C.C.S.M., c. H175, s. 6, as am.
by S.M. 1977, c. 46; Human Rights Code, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11, s. 3, as am.
by S.N.B. 1976, c. 3 1, s. 2; Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. II, as am.
by S.N.S. 1974, c. 46, s. 1; Human Rights Act, S.P.E.1. 1975, c. 72, R.S.P.E.I.
1974, H-12.2, s. 11; Canadian Human Rights Acts, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, ss. 3,
7-10
118. Physical handicap or disability may be caused by bodily injury, birth defect
or illness and includes epilepsy and, but is not limited to ... For definitions see:
The Human Rights Act, C.C.S.M., cH175 enacted by S.M. 1974, c. 65, s. 1 as
am. by S.M. 1977, c. 46, s.1; Human Rights Code, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11, s. 2
as am. by S.N.B. 1976, c. 31, s. 1; Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, s. 11
as am. by S.N.S. 1974, c. 46, s.1; Human Rights Act, S.P.E.I. 1975, c. 72,
R.S.P.E.I. 1974, H-12.2, s.11, Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33,
s. 20
119. Gordon Fairweather, supra note 116
120. Ed. Russell, supra note 109
121. "Human Rights Report", supra note 113, at 5
122. The Human Rights Commission in Saskatchewan had has particular success
in persuading employers to employ the mentally handicapped by using economic
incentives. (Ed. Russell, supra note 109)
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VI. Legislation Affecting Employment Skills
A mentally handicapped person's lack of employment skills is
probably his greatest liability in attempting to obtain employment.
As previously mentioned, lack of skills generally prevents the issue
of discrimination from arising, and it deters the afflicted person
from seeking a job. The legislation considered in this section affects
the important employment skills of self-reliance and initiative as
well as education and professional and technical qualifications.
Legislation concerning vocational rehabilitation services will also
be considered.
Over-protection of the mentally handicapped is a major pitfall in
the legislation. Although municipal and provincial social assistance
legislation aims to promote independence and vocational
rehabilitation,' 2 3 it authorizes the appointment of a trustee without
requiring an adjudication of incompetency. Further, the trustee is
charged only with the administration of the trust monies, not with
the encouragement of the client to take as much responsibility as
possible nor with determination of the point at which the client no
longer needs a trustee. 124 Alberta appears to be the only
jurisdiction 125 in which the incompetency legislation strives to
allow the person to retain as many rights as he is capable of
handling. While most jurisdictions permit an adjudication that an
individual is incapable of managing his person and/or his estate,126
and allow the court to restrict the powers of the trustee or committee
of the estate,' 27 the tone of the acts encourages comprehensive
control. 128 This is echoed in legislation which authorizes an
123. See Part IV, para. I and note 106
124. See note 108
125. The legislation in Manitoba, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and
Quebec was not surveyed.
126. Patients' Estate Act, S.B.C. 1962, c. 44, ss. 2, 16, as am. S.B.C. 1964, c.
36, ss. 2,9; S.B.C. 1965, c. 32, ss. 1,7; S.B.C. 1968, c. 36, s.2; S.B.C. 1976, c.
33, s. 104; Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.I-8, ss. 6,9, as am. by S.N.B.
1979, c. 41, s. 66; Mental Incompetency Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 271, ss. 8, 12; The
Mentally Disordered Persons Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 346, ss. 3, 6, as am. by S.S.
1972, c. 71. [Nova Scotia is the notable exception. See Incompetent Persons Act,
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 135, s. 2, as am.]
127. Infirm Persons Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.I-8, ss. 11,39, as am.; Mental
Incompetency Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 271, ss. 12, 14, 18, 39; The Mentally
Disordered Persons Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 346, ss. 14, 18, 42, as am. by S.S. 1972,
c. 71
128. The acts do not list the powers of the guardian of the person and do not
emphasize that the trustee of the estate may have only partial control. This is
particularly true of the Patient's Estate Act, S.B.C. 1962, c. 44, as am. While the
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investigation into the competency of a patient to manage his
estate.'12 Over-protection of the mentally handicapped is undesira-
ble not only because it inhibits them from realizing their potential,
but because it is unjust to deprive a person of rights that he is
capable of exercising.
A person's educational qualifications greatly influence his
eligibility for employment. While the focus here is on adults it must
be noted that the education received by those under sixteen years of
age significantly affects their employment prospects, especially the
mildly retarded who are often termed "slow" simply because they
receive a poor start in life due to economic or social
disadvantage(s). Increasing the services available to the mentally
handicapped in the regular education system would reduce the
likelihood of them being stigmatized by the public, prospective
employers and the administrators of the minimum wage
legislation. 130
A person's right to practice certain occupations or professions
may be cancelled or suspended in the event of unsoundness of mind,
mental illness or insanity, or any conduct that may constitute or
demonstrate incompetency, misconduct or conduct detrimental to
the public interest. For example, a barrister who is "too ill,
physically, mentally or emotionally, to practise [may if] the public
interest so requires be suspended from practice." 131 There are many
other acts with similar provisions. 132 The vagueness of the wording
means that there is wide administrative discretion.
Although various levels of government are very involved in
Mental Incompetency Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 271, is slightly better than the others,
even it stands in marked contrast to Dependent Adults Act, S.A. 1976, c. 63, ss. 1,
6, 9, 10, 27 (2), as am. These sections attempt to preserve as many rights of the
dependent adult as possible by requiring a review of the trusteeship order and
emphasizing that full guardianship should only be granted if partial powers are
insufficient to meet the needs of the person. This statute appears to be more realistic
in another sense: although as of December 1978 it had not been judicially
considered, it would seem that the guardian of the person, not the trustee of the
estate, would determine the dependent adult's eligiblity for employment. This is
because the guardian may have control over work, education and vocational or
other training (ss. 9, 10), while actions on the employment contract are not
specifically included in the trustee's powers (ss. 29, 30).
129. See notes 30 and 31
130. See note 67
131. Barristers and Solicitors Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 18, s. 32 as am. by S.N.S.
1977, c. 23, s. 5; S.N.S. 1978-79, c. 11, s. 5
132. B.B. Swadron, The Law and Mental Disorder, (Toronto: The Canadian
Mental Health Association, 1973), at 84-91
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attempts to increase the employment skills of citizens the only
legislation dealing specifically with the problems of the disabled is
the federal Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons Act,
which authorizes federal-provincial agreements,' 33 and the result-
ing provincial legislation. One of the components of the provincial
vocational rehabilitation program which will be eligible for the
federal reimbursement of 50 percent' 34 is the utilization of "the
services of voluntary organizations that are carrying on activities in
the Province in the field of vocational rehabilitation of disabled
persons."' 3 5 Under this mandate the Province of Nova Scotia has
enacted legislation regarding the funding of these activities' 36 and
presently funds workshops to the extent of 65 percent of an
approved budget.13 7 The Province is required to "establish an
appropriate administrative organization within the Province to
administer and to co-ordinate all activities in the Province relating to
the vocational rehabilitation of disabled persons", 38 which
encompasses seeking out disabled persons, giving them counsel-
ling, guidance and assessment, and supplying or arranging for
necessary vocational rehabilitation services. These services will be
examined in the next section. Although the province has attempted
to fulfill its mandate,' 3 9 in view of the frequent criticism that there
is a lack of co-ordination of services it would be informative if
statistics were available allowing one to assess its success.
VII Sen,ices Affecting Employment Skills
A recurring theme of advocates of the rights of the mentally ill and
the mentally retarded is that the mentally handicapped must be
133. RS.C. 1970, c. V-7, s. 3, as am.
134. Vocational Rehabilitation of Persons Agreement Between The Government
of Canada and the Province of Nova Scotia, s. 2 (hereinafter referred to as the
"Fed.-Prov. VRDP Agreement"). Because the "Fed.-Prov. VRDP Agreement" is
in a standard form, the agreements with the other provinces probably have identical
terms.
135. "Fed.-Prov. VRDP Agreement", id., subs. 4(c)
136. Social Assistance Act, S.N.S. 1970, c. 16, ss. 42-44, as am. by S.N.S.
1973, c. 71; Rehabilitation and Social Development Approval and Assistance
Regulations, R. & R., S.N.S. 1974, p. 359.
137. Mr. George Matthews, supra note 12, stated that the proportion of funding
was determined by ministerial discretion and that provincial funding was instituted
in 1969 at a rate of 50 per cent and increased in 1974/75 to the present 65 per cent.
See note 194 for details.
138. "Fed.-Prov. VRDP Agreement", supra note 134, s. 7
139. Peggy Sandford, Coordinator of Rehabilitation Services, Department of
Social Services, Province of Nova Scotia
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entitled to develop to the fullest extent their capabilities to perform
productive work. It is given moral support by inclusion in the 1971
United Nation's "Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded
Persons", Article 111,140 and economic and governmental support
by the federally and provincially accepted theory that vocational
rehabilitation is desirable because it would restore disabled persons
"to usefulness . . . so that as far as possible they are enabled to
contribute to Canada." ' 141 In Halifax, it receives municipal
endorsement because encouraging "the individual to use his skills
and personal resources towards independence" 142 is one of the
goals of the City of Halifax Social Planning and Recreation
Department.
The mentally handicapped's lack of skills is the most obvious
factor hampering his eligibility for employment. The extent to
which proper education and training can reduce their limitations is
not widely realized. Although the needs of each mentally
handicapped person are unique there is a basic difference between
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, or the post-mentally ill.
The mentally retarded are regarded as having limited abilities, at
least to some extent (it has been suggested that not only may their
abilities be increased with education, but that they may be oriented
to specific tasks) ,'4 while the mentally ill are thought of as having a
curable disease. The ability of both groups to become productive
members of society may be hampered by factors that have
contributed to their handicap or be a result of it, such as, economic
and cultural deprivation, reliance on drugs or adjustment to a
therapy oriented institution rather than a competitive society. For
these reasons a vocational rehabilitation program is frequently only
one part of a plan designed to help the mentally handicapped person
to "cope". Such a program will attempt, for example, to ensure
that he has accommodation suited to his needs and to teach him
leisure and socialization skills, including the employment skill of
being able to recognize that a superior is an authority, not a support
figure.1 44 While these needs and services and the legislation and
140. See Appendix IV
141. This theory is part of the preamble to the "Fed.-Prov. VRDP Agreement",
supra note 134.
142. "Halifax Social Services Manual", supra note 97, Introduction: Statement of
Principles
143. B. B. Swadron, supra note 88, at 60
144. Marie Kavanaugh, Social Worker at the Abbie J. Lane Memorial Hospital,
Halifax, Nova Scotia
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administration schemes governing them have repercussions on
vocational rehabilitation, the focus of this section will be on
vocational rehabilitation. For practical reasons, field research was
confined to Halifax.
A. Overview
Organizations that provide vocational services for the mentally
handicapped recognize that not all of their clients will be able to
achieve full self-sufficiency in the sense of being able to compete in
the open labour market. They attempt to include in their spectrum of
services programs which will allow such individuals to live as
"normal" a life as possible; that is, the services will, to the greatest
extent possible, be non-institutional and emphasize traditional work
values such as punctuality, regular attendance and gainful
occupations. Of course they also aim to provide the means whereby
those who are capable of achieving self-sufficiency may do so. 145
This inquiry into the vocational rehabilitation services in Halifax
that are designed for the mentally handicapped revealed, unfortu-
nately, that while plans which appear impressive have been
formulated, 146 they have not been realized. 147 The Abbie J. Lane
Memorial Hospital prepares patients for discharge by in-patient and
out-patient services. The Industrial Therapy Co-ordinator helps the
very few patients ready for discharge find jobs. 148 The Abbie Lane
145, Bill Grant, Coordinator of Citizen Advocacy Program, Canadian Association
for the Mentally Retarded, Halifax Branch; Sandy Leim, supra note 66; "Moyer
Report", supra note 8
146. C. Edwards Doherty, "On-the-Job-Training" (a description of the program
prepared for C.A.M.R.'s internal use) states that on-the-job training is designed to
bridge the gap between sheltered workshops, or sheltered industry, and competitive
community employment. The Program may operate in three ways: (i) work crews
or teams (ii) work stations or adapted industry (iii) job tryout/adjustment, with the
last type most resembling the competitive employment situation. The "Moyer
Report, id., at p. 3 develops a program for the post-mentally ill that has a similar
structure although the terminology and aims differ somewhat. The facilities include
work training centres (similar to sheltered workshops) and sheltered workshops
(similar to sheltered industry). There are two services that are notably different
from those proposed by the C.A.M.R.: adapted industry (a relatively competitive
situation providing a meaningful job history) and more emphasis on vocational
rehabilitation and support services.
147. See Part I
148. Until recently the Abbie Lane's patients were the chronically ill. For a variety
of reasons, including severity of mental illness, institutionalization and loss of
skills very few chronically ill patients are ever able to maintain competitive
employment.
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Social Work Department, which handles the out-patient services for
the ex-psychiatric patients of all hospitals in Halifax, uses seminars
and individual counselling services to help approximately twenty-
nine people increase their living, including employment, skills.
Many of these people need training as their institutionalization has
lowered their level of skills. 149 At present there are only two
vocational programs designed specifically for the post-mentally ill
which serve a few people who are highly eligible for
employment. 1,5°
The services available to the mentally retarded in the Halifax area
suffer from different deficiencies. Although they reach a larger
percentage of those in need, the most common service is
workshops 1 ' which are notably unlike the normal work situation,
although they are becoming less like activity centres; 152 the Adult
Services Centre is conducting some training outside the workshop
by competing for building cleaning contracts. 153
The only other programs available to the non-institutionalized1 54
mentally handicapped are workshops designed for all handicapped
149. Marie Kavanaugh, and Steve Bormeman, Social Workers at the Abbie J.
Lane Memorial Hospital, Halifax
150. One of these programs is Domestic Applicance Repair Centre which provides
a service. It was designed as a sheltered workshop but due to its financial and
vocational rehabilitational success, it is now an almost self-sufficient adapted
industry run by Human Resource Development Association. Rebound Industries
was designed as an adapted industry requiring a fairly high level of skill from its
employees, who manufacture high quality wooden toys on a small construction line
basis. Each facility employs approximately five people. [Marie Kavanaugh and
Steve Bornemen, id.; Yvonne Blanchard, in charge of Special Projects in the City
of Halifax Social Planning and Devel.opment Unit.l
151. See Part I for figures. Also, there are presently no sheltered industries in
Nova Scotia (Norma Lloyd, supra note 2) and data on the numbers in on-the-job
training is unavailable.
152. Activity centres are no longer part of the vocational rehabilitation services as
their goal of keeping the adults "busy" is not consistent with increasing their
eligibility for employment. Workshops are placing increasing emphasis on
task-related training and on obtaining contracts which are at least marginally
profitable. George Matthews, supra note 12; Sandy Leim supra note 66; Mr.
McRae, Parliamentary Secretary to Federal Minister of Health and Welfare,
"Proceedings of the Seminar on the Employability of the Handicapped," supra
note 73, at 55
153. Sandy Leim, id.
154. A person in an Adult Residential Centre or Regional Rehabilitation Centre
will receive some training, although the amount and type -will depend upon Nvhich
category of institution he is in. Homes for Special Care Regulations, N.S. Reg.
127/77, R.N.S. Vol. 1 No. 6, p. 2; Ken Jupp, in charge of Adult Insitutional
Services for the Mentally Handicapped, Social Services Department, Province of
Nova Scotia
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such as Goodwill Industries, New Leaf Enterprises, part-time work
arranged by the municipality (Project 50) ,15 formal training such as
that provided by municipal adult education and Canada Manpower
Institutional Training, on-the-job training placements arranged
through Canada Manpower (CMITP) 155a or through the Services
Department of the Province of Nova Scotia. While this is an
impressive array of names, the value of these services to the
mentally handicapped is questionable.
Workshops which serve the physically, mentally and emotionally
handicapped are not efficient. Not only will they not realize their
goal of helping a person reach his occupational potential but,
because they are not geared to the client's particular needs, they
may actually be dysfunctional, causing the individual's problems to
multiply. 156 A moral argument against them is that "lumping" all
the handicapped together "smacks of keeping them out of sight and
out of mind." Formal classroom training will only be of benefit to
well-adjusted individuals who lack an employment qualification.
This is obviously not the case with the mentally handicapped. The
usefulness of Project 50 has been questioned on the grounds that
because it is not a realistic facsimile of the normal situation, it
serves simply as a source of extra income, not as a means of
instilling in the individual the traditional work values necessary for
his vocational rehabilitation. 15 7 However, as with most oppor-
tunities for the mentally handicapped it can be justified on the
grounds that it is "better than nothing". Employment in sheltered
155. Project 50 arranges part-time (up to 25 hours per month) work for recipients
of municipal social assistance who are not classified as able bodied unemployed.
They receive training from employers in the community and $50 per month from
the municipality. "Halifax Social Services Manual", supra note 97, parts 1.2.6.9,
1.3.21.7; Yvonne Blanchard, supra note 150
155a. CMITP is employer-centered training for which the employer is partially
-eimbursed by the Commission. It attempts to increase the employment
)pportunities available to "clients with special needs" (i.e. those with mental,
;motional, social, psychiatric or physical problems) by reimbursing the employer
'or 85% of their wage costs (in contrast to a reimbursement of 40% for training the
.mployed and 60% for training those unemployed or threatened with unemploy-
nent). It is more suited to the mentally handicapped than the Institutional Training
3rogram. [Information obtained from "Basic Facts on Social Security Programs"
1978) prepared by the Welfare Information System Branch of Health and Welfare
7anada, at pp. 23-27 and Mr. Fader, Industrial Training Consultant, Nova Scotia
legion.]
56. Bill Grant, supra note 145 states that transfers of deviancies occur in these
ituations.
57. Laurie Webber, supra note 48
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industry and on-the-job training, services which would be of great
assistance to the mentally handicapped who are capable of
becoming fully competitive members of society, are the ones which
serve the fewest. 
158
B. The Legal Status of the Work of the Mentally Handicapped in
Workshops and Institutions
Both the mentally ill and the mentally retarded often perform work
for which they do not receive the normal advantages of
employment, that is the right to payment of at least minimum wage
and to participation in government plans such as Canada Pension
Plan, Unemployment Insurance and Workmen's Compensation.
The major reasons for this are that the workshops and institutions do
not regard them as employees, and that the government has allowed
this view to prevail. This section will examine and critically analyze
the reasons for the existing situation that are advanced by the
administrators of the institutions and of the applicable legislation.
A workshop for the mentally retarded, the Adult Services Centre
in Halifax, pays their clients $7.50 for a 30-hour week. 159 This is
not contrary to the provincial minimum wage legislation since their
clients are exempted as they are classified as "persons receiving
training under government approved plans".160 Inmates of mental
institutions, such as the Abbie J. Lane Memorial Hospital in
Halifax, who receive 20-30 cents per hour161 would probably be
similarly exempted under the theory that work therapy is
training. 162 In those jurisdictions which do not have a similar
exemption in their minimum wage legislation163 this practice would
158. See note 151. Also, although data on the numbers in on-the-job training is
unavailable, it is well known that there are not many, e.g. CMITP only aims to
have 10 percent of its participants be "clients with special needs". Mr. Faderm
supra note 155a
159. Sandy Leim, supra note 66
160. Minmum Wage Order General, N.S. Reg. 84/77, R.N.S. Vol. 1, No. 3, p.
53, sub. l(f); Ross Mitchell, Director of Labour Standards Division, Province of
Nova Scotia. For a discussion of the possible reasons underlying this exemption see
note 180.
161. Laurie Webber, supra note 48
162. Ross Mitchell, supra note 160
163. Other provinces which have excluded from the operation of the minimum
wage legislation categories of workers which could include handicapped patients or
trainees are: British Columbia (by numerous regulations, e.g. B.C. Reg. 290/73
excluding "mentally retarded trainees . .. at the Nanaimo Association for the
Mentally Retarded, Nanaimo, B.C. for the period expiring February 28th 1974.")
Manitoba (by the Employment Standards Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. E 110, subs. 2(g)
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only be acceptable if it could be said that the minimum wage
legislation did not apply to the patients or trainees because they did
not fall within the statute's definition of an employee' 64 or if the
institution had obtained the specific permission of the administrators
of the legislation. 165
Neither the Abbie Lane nor the Adult Services Centre believe that
they are taking advantage of their patients or clients. The major
reason is that they do not believe that these people are employees
because the programs are designed to benefit them, by providing
work therapy for the patients and skills training for the clients. Both
institutions also advance two practical reasons. The Abbie Lane
argues that the remuneration need only be small, as a form of
incentive, since the hospital pays all the patient's expenses and the
work is of no benefit to the hospital as it has sufficient staff to
operate without patient labour. The Adult Services Centre supports
its position on the grounds that the aim of the workshop is to break
even, or make a small profit which is channelled back into their
training program, and that if the trainees earned too much it would
adversely affect their social assistance.166 Although I believe these
justifications to be bonafide, under the present circumstances, this
institutional practice may be criticized on both moral and legal
grounds.
Even if a workshop does not consciously keep skilled, productive
workers so that the workshop can make some profit to contribute to
the proportion of their expenses that C.A.M.R. must fund, 167 it
(v) as am. by S.M. 1972, c. 52, s. 1 and by the Regulation Respecting Minimum
Wages and Working Conditions under the Employment Standards Act, M.R.R.
1971, E 110-RI, s. 4, as am., which exempts "employers who are employing
persons under a training scheme"); Newfoundland (by orders, e.g. Nfld. Reg.
198/78 exempting handicapped trainees at St. John's Goodwill Centre); Quebec
(by Ordinance No. 4, 1972, adopted by the Minimum Wage Commission, gazetted
on July 29, 1972, in Vol. 104, No. 30, at p. 6252, s. 4, which exempts "patients
who have not been released from hospital but who... are assigned to an employer
for social rehabilitation purposes"); Saskatchewan (by the Labour Standards
Regulations, Sask. Reg. 317/77, s. 16, which exempts "employees of sheltered
workshops or work activity centres who are socially, physically or mentally
impaired or handicapped").
164. The Labour Standards Act, S.N. 1977, c. 52, subs. 2(d), as am. specifically
requires a contract of service for the minimum wage legislation to apply.
165. See note 63 for legislation authorizing this.
166. Sandy Leim, supra note 66, and Laurie Webber, supra note 51. Laurie
Webber stated that if the patient did perform a job which would normally require a
member of staff, then he would be paid the minimum wage.
167. See Part VI, para. 5 and Part VIIC, para. I for details.
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could be paying a client far too little. This could be due to an
insufficient emphasis on job placement 168 and to constrictions
(actual or perceived) of the provincial and municipal social
assistance plans' benefits. 1
69
The unrestricted operation of institutional work therapy programs
has been frequently criticized in the United States by lawyers,
psychologists, psychiatrists and the courts, on the ground that too
often the aim of the work is not therapy but the performance of
menial, time-consuming tasks essential to the functioning of the
institutions. 170 Whether or not this situation exists in Canada may
well be worth investigating. Even if it does not, it can be argued that
the patient should receive closer to the minimum wage because
justice, 171 and frequently the statutory authority for depriving a
non-criminal of his freedom, 172 bestow a right to treatment upon
such a patient; this encompasses a right to programs which offer
work closely parallel to normal work, that is, meaningful jobs with
substantial compensation.173
The institutions' attitude can be criticized on the legal ground that
the patients and clients are employees. While no test for
distinguishing employees from trainees has been established, Lord
Thankerton's test in Short v. Henderson Ltd.1 74 is the most
appropriate as it does not emphasize the distinction between a
contract of service and a contract for service, but simply the
distinguishing criteria of the contract of service itself. They are: (a)
the master's power of selection of his servant; (b) the payment of
168. Bill Grant, supra note 145
169. See Part VIIC for details
170. M. J. Perlin, "The Right to Voluntary, Compensated, Therapeutic Work as
Part of the Right to Treatment: A New Theory in the Aftermath of Souder" (1976),
7 Seton Hall Law Rev. 298, at 298-299
171. M. J. Perlinid.
172. B. B. Swadron, supra note 132, at 45; for example, it can be argued that the
Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 249, impliedly grants a patient the right to
treatment. A patient may be admitted to a facility for observation or remain as an
informal patient only if a qualified practitioner believes that he requires the
in-patient services provided by the facility (subs. 27, 28, 34(1)). Therefore a formal
patient whose detainment is compulsory because he "suffers from a psychiatric
disorder and is a danger to his own safety or the safety of others (subs. 34(2))
should have an even stronger right to treatment. This is supported by the authority
of the Governor in Council to make regulations "with respect to any matters that he
considers necessary or desirable to insure high standards of treatment and care of
patients". (subs. 15(r)).
173. M. J. Perlin, supra note 170, at 322
174. (1946), 62T.L.R. 427 (H.L.), at429
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wages or other remuneration; (c) the master's right to control the
method of doing the work; and (d) the master's right of suspension
or dismissal. As the essential element of the contract of service is
the right to control, the contract may still exist if some of these
elements are absent altogether or present only in an unusual form. In
one of the Canadian cases which applied this test, it was stated that
the surrounding circumstances as well as the contract are to be taken
into account. 175 Frequently all four elements of the test are present,
to at least some degree, in the work of the patient and client of the
institutions under consideration. While defining such people,
especially patients, as employees may well be extending the
definition to a non-traditional area, 176 it will not be distorting it, and
the Minimum Wage Board is willing to fully consider the matter if it
arises. 177 The validity of viewing a client as an employee is
strengthened by their similarity to apprentices, who have
traditionally been regarded as a special type of employee.
Recognition of patients and clients as employees may not
increase their wages due to their exemption from minimum wage
legislation, 178 or specific permissions 179 but an open discussion of
the issue'8 0 may lead to more supervision, by the funding bodies or
the Minimum Wage Board, and should result in reassessment of the
reasons for their low wages.
At present neither the Abbie Lane nor the Adult Services Centre
participates in Unemployment Insurance, Canada Pension Plan or
Workmen's Compensation on behalf of its patients or clients. Again
the justification is that they are not employees.181 The necessity for
175. Earthworm Red River Ltd. v. Underwood, Mclellan & Assoc. Ltd. 19723 1
W.W.R. (Man. Q.B.) 362, at 370, affd without comment [19731 2 W.W.R. 576.
This test was also applied in Marine Pipelines andDredging Ltd. v. Canadian Fina
OilLtd. (1964), 48 W.W.R. 462 (Alta. S.C.A.D.).
176. Ross Mitchell, supra note 160, stated that the Minimum Wage Board would
not examine relationships such as these, which have traditionally not been regarded
as employment relationships, unless the question arose in a complaint made by one
of the parties to the relationship.
177. Id.
178. See notes 160 and 163
179. See note 63
180. Although I have not discovered the reasons for this exemption in the
Minimum Wage Order, I agree with Ross Mitchell, supra note 160, that the
exemption is probably due to administrative convenience, the trainees'
ionattachment to the traditional workforce, and the belief that the funding body
supervises the program. In this case no such supervision occurs, as the Department
)f Services believes that this falls within the discretion of the local board of the
association that is managing the program. [George Matthews, supra note 12]
18 I. Sandy Leim, supra note 66 and Laurie Webber, supra note 48
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contributions is decided by Revenue Canada, not in accordance with
a general ruling but on the basis of the individual
employer/employee relationship, and this issue only arises if a
government auditor or an employee queries the practice. Although
Revenue Canada will not disclose this confidential information,1 82
it seems reasonable to conclude that non-participation has never
been questioned. If it were questioned a conclusion that patients or
clients have a contract of service would in itself bring them within
these various employment statutes. They may not work for the
minimum number of hours necessary to contribute to the U.I.C. (20
hours per week) 183 and may not earn enough to contribute to the
C.P.P. ($21.15 per week), 184 and terming them employees for this
purpose would be inconsistent with classifying them as incapable of
work and thus eligible for social assistance benefits. 18 5
In determining whether the mentally handicapped may participate
in the Workmen's Compensation Plan, the attitude of the provincial
administration is important. Although the handicapped often may
face obstacles due to the erroneous belief that they are "high
risk", 186 the Nova Scotia Workmen's Compensation Board has
granted coverage to a workshop for post-mentally ill patients who
were receiving the minimum wage. 187 It is even willing to deem the
trainees at the Adult Services Centre to be earning the minimum
wage and to cover them at the relatively low rate (450 per $100 of
wages) common to all welfare organizations which provide this type
of training. ' 8 8 This type of coverage is desirable because it will be
consistent with viewing the trainees as employees, it is often
required by the owners of the buildings in which some of the
trainees clean,' 8 9 and the benefits are frequently greater than those
provided by provincial and municipal assistance.' 90 It is thus
182. Bonnie Mercer, Ruling Officer for C.P.P. and U.I.C. at Revenue Canada
Taxation
183. Unemployment Insurance Regulations, amendment, S.O.R./79-168
184. Canada Pension Plan Regulations, amendment, S.O.R./78-935
185. See Section IVA
186. The California Workmen's Compensation Board refused to cover blind and
deaf employees who were operating saws. When an accident occured, it was to a
supervisor, not a handicapped person. "California Bigots" The Touchstone (ed. by
Steve Freygood) of Halifax, Nova Scotia (May 1979) Vol. 2, No. 5, at 19
187. Yvonne Blanchard, supra note 150. The workshop was the Domestic
Appliance Repair Centre described in note 150.
188. Mr. MacAuley, Chief Assessment Officer, Workmen's Compensation Board
of Nova Scotia
189. Claire Edwards-Doherty, Director of Adult Services Centre, Halifax
190. The normal benefit paid by Workmen's Compensation is 75% of the worker's
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unfortunate that the Adult Services Centre cannot afford the
premiums.' 91 The question of insuring patients who participate in a
work therapy program has not arisen. If it did arise, they would
probably be treated in the same manner as the trainees, if the
Workmen's Compensation Board gave its approval. 192
The present practices of the Abbie Lane and the Adult Services
Centre, based on their apparently unquestioned assumption that
their patients and clients are not employees, and the difficulty that
the Adult Services Centre is experiencing in obtaining private
accident coverage for its trainees while they are working outside the
workshop,' 93 are further illustrations of society's historical
misunderstanding of or lack of concern for the mentally
handicapped's needs and abilities. Even if they are not classified as
employees, if the mentally handicapped receive the normal benefits
of employment, particularly higher compensation, it will probably
increase the success of the training or therapy. The Adult Services
Centre's concern with financial restrictions and with the effect of
income on the trainee's social assistance demonstrates the
importance to vocational rehabilitation services of funding and of
the provincial and municipal social assistance.
C. Some Ramifications of Legislation
The Adult Services Centre's lack of funds is occasioned by the fact
that the only governmental financial support that they receive is the
free use of their building, from the municipality, and 65 percent of
an approved budget, from the province. 194 However, two types of
institutions which provide rehabilitation services are lO0 percent
government financed. These are Regional Rehabilitation Centres
wage [Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 343, ss. 32, 33, as am.
by S.N.S. 1968, c. 65]. In this case the injured trainee will receive $330 per month.
If he is single, the maximum that he can receive from provincial assistance is $267
per month and the municipality will only supplement this is he has a budget deficit
based on his allowable needs and he has a budget deficit based on his allowable
needs and his income. [See Section IVC, para 2, notes 103-105.] Thus the single
worker will generally gain from Workmen's Compensation and, in any case, he
will suffer no detriment.
191. Claire Edwards-Doherty, supra note 189
192. Mr. Murray, Supervisor of Assessments, Workmen's Compensation Board
of Nova Scotia
193. Claire Edwards-Doherty, supra note 189
194. George Matthews, supra note 12, stated that the approved budget would
include most acutal expenses but not fund-raising costs or payments to the
provincial or national organizations. See also note 137
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(emphasizing short-term care and rehabilitation, including voca-
tional), which are totally supported by the provincial government,
and Adult Residential Centres (for those in need of long-term care)
which are reimbursed by the provincial government for 6 62/3
percent of their expenses 95 and by the municipality for the
remainder. 196 This funding pattern does not seem consistent with
the provincial and municipal goal of promoting independence, as it
is well accepted that normalization is most likely to occur in a
non-institutional setting. The explanation would seem to be rooted
in the historical fact that charities, such as the Canadian Association
for the Mentally Retarded which manages the Adult Services
Centre, have never been fully funded by the government. Similarly,
tradition accounts for the greater municipal financial involvement in
Adult Residential Centres than Regional Rehabilitation Centres.1
97
Such costly policy decisions should not be unquestioningly
determined by past practice. Clearly, non-institutional vocational
rehabilitation services should be encouraged by increased govern-
ment funding, with a corresponding increase in supervision over
such matters as wages paid to the trainees.
Municipal and provincial assistance legislation contains incentive
programs and eligibility requirements which affect, both directly
and indirectly, by encouraging the workshops to pay low wages, a
recipient's desire to achieve vocational rehabilitation. The munici-
pal government's policy is to allow their clients only a $20.00
incentive, 198 but their policy is much more flexible and
incentive-oriented than it seems; projects such as Project 50,
"Pre-Training Placement" and "Employability Preparation Pro-
ject", which attempt to stimulate independence, have obtained
specific approval and have unique incentive programs. 199 The
provincial assistance program, which affects a greater number of the
mentally handicapped than the municipal assistance does,
200
195. Ken Jupp, supra note 154, stated that these amounts were determined by
ministerial decision. The Minister has this authority under the Homes for Special
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 127/77, R.N.S. Vol. I No. 6, p. 2
196. Mr. Stewart, supra note 97
197. Ken Jupp, supra note 154, stated that the municipalities traditionally had
responsibility for poor houses, the forerunners of the Adult Residential Centres, but
that the more extensive Regional Rehabilitation Centres have arisen only recently,
from the health system's concept of a right to treatment.
198. "Halifax Social Services Manual", supra note 97, part 1.2.6
199. Id., parts 1.3.21.6, 1.3.21.7, 1.3.21.13, 1.3.21.14
200. See notes 98 and 99
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appears to be more progressive as it only includes as income
"twenty-five percent of net wages earned while the applicant or
recipient is disabled and the wages result from participation in a
rahabilitation program ... ,.2Ol However, a disabled recipient
whose gross wages or salary are over $100 per month will not be
able to receive family benefits unless he is engaging in vocational
rehabilitation and has the specific permission of the Director.
202
This provision and the specific approvals granted by the
municipality illustrate the importance of knowledge of the
legislation and of administrative cooperation. However, the
provincial regulations are inflexible in one important way: a
disabled person who earns over $100 per month for a period
exceeding four months will not be eligible to receive benefits.
20a
The rationale for this appears to be that he is then no longer regarded
as unemployable. 0 4 This is not realistic as four months may be too
short a period in which to determine if a job placement is successful.
Further, a person working full-time may well be performing work
which is valued at $100 per month yet not be "employable". This
unrealistic and inflexible regulation, coupled with the
municipality's requirement that the person attempt to establish
eligibility for provincial assistance, 20 5 and the difficulties in doing
so, 20 6 encourages work for the disabled which pays only nominal
wages.
The provincial government should either raise the ceilings on a
disabled recipient's allowable earnings so that they are in accord
with reality, or abolish these threshold requirements and limit the
Director's discretion only by the factors that he must take into
201. Family Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78 R.N.S. Vo. 2 No. 5, p. 109,
subs. 35(2) (b), as am. Ivor Hambling, Director of Family Benefits, Social
Services Department, Province of Nova Scotia, stated that in calculating net wages
they will deduct from the gross wages any employer deductions and the actual cost,
if reasonable, of such necessary items as day care, special clothing and
transportation.
202. Family Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg. 70/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2 No. 5, p. 109,
subs. 35(4), as am.
203. Family Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg. 50/78, R.N.S. Vol. 2 No. 5, p. 109,
subs. 35(4), as am.
204. Mr. Gorsline, supra note 99. This is reinforced by the primary requirement
that a person must establish unemployability in order to be classified as disabled.
[Family Benefits Regulations, N.S. Reg. 5017S, R.N.S. Vol. 2 No. 5, p. I09,
subs. 4(g), as am.]
205. See note 102
206. Mr. Stewart, supra note 97 and Yvonne Blanchard, supra note 150, stated
that this procedure was both lengthy and formal.
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account. However, without awaiting such legislative change, the
first priority should be to promote increased awareness among
recipients and those concerned with their welfare, 20 7 of the existing
flexibility so that they can fully avail themselves of the benefits
provided in the present legislation. Organizations which provide
vocational rehabilitation services would be further encouraged to
base the trainees' salaries on their productivity if the province fully
reimbursed them for this cost. While the administrative cooperation
required is considerable, this could probably be accomplished
without undue cost to the province by increasing the percentage of
the wages counted as income as the wages increased. Although the
trainee's income would not be dramatically increased, their
vocational rehabilitation should be furthered by increased self-
confidence and belief in the value of their work.
D. Summary
As the problems, and rights, of the mentally handicapped,
particularly those concerning employment, are just achieving
recognition it is understandable that the vocational rehabilitation
services appear to be largely ad hoc. Such services should be
increased, rationalised and coordinated; flexible counselling
services, similar to those available through the Social Development
and Rehabilitation Division of the Services Department, should be
readily accessible to the individual. The work of patients and
trainees should come under government supervision, and its legal
status should be clarified. Vocational rehabilitation services are
frequently only one form of government assistance that unemployed
mentally handicapped individuals are receiving, thus all services,
administrative agencies and enabling legislation should be ex-
amined to ensure that they do not hamper the overall objective of
enabling the individual to achieve the greatest possible degree of
self-sufficiency.
VIII. Conclusion: Summary and Recommendations
The public's lack of awareness of the mentally handicappeds' needs
and rights has resulted in judge-made law, legislation, and social
services which have either been inadequate or have hindered the
207. Organizations' lack of awareness of the governing legislation was
demonstrated when the Work Procurement Officer at the Adult Services Centre
mentioned that he did not have a copy of the Family Benefits Regulations.
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mentally handicapped in their attempt to increase their eligibility for
employment. The mentally ill have been particularly neglected as
they do not have such committed advocates for their rights as the
mentally retarded. 208
In particular, the law determining capacity to contract is not
consistent with modern pyschiatric theory and is even more
restrictive than the law relating to infants, who may be regarded as
another minority with impaired reasoning. Federal and provincial
human rights legislation does not entrench the civil rights of the
mentally handicapped while other legislation unjustifiably deprives
them thereof. Rehabilitation services are not comprehensive or
coordinated; only good vocational rehabilitation can allow a
mentally handicapped person to become, if not a fully productive
member of, at least a minimum drain upon, society.
There should be more research into the problems and needs of the
mentally handicapped in order to rationalize the law and services
affecting them. Funding is needed to provide these necessary
services. All of this demands an enlightened and cooperative public
attitude which can only be created if advocates of the rights of the
mentally handicapped make them a politically "hot" minority. All
the formal and informal means of effecting social change: the
media, test cases, class actions, political lobbying by voluntary
organizations, by unions and by organs of government (such as the
Office of the Ombudsman and human rights commissions), must be
fully utilized to increase public recognition of this problem.
208. The mentally ill seldom have a support figure comparable to the parents of the
mentally retarded.



























Mild (educable mentally retarded): can attain a state of self-sufficiency as adults by
special educational techniques, can hold simple jobs.
Moderate (trainable mentally retarded): can learn to take care of their personal
needs and to perform many useful tasks and manual skills in the home or
in a sheltered working situation.




Self-sufficiency (employment in ordinary labour market)







209. M. Stahman, "Legal Planning for the Mentally Retarded" (1974), 10 Idaho
L. Rev. 245, at 245
210. Id.; D. E. Haggarty, L. A. Kane, D. K. Udall, "An Essay on the Legal
Rights of the Mentally Retarded" (1972), 6 Family L. Q. 59, at 64-65
211. C. W. Murdock, "Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical
Issues" (1977), 48 Notre Dame Law 133, at 163
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APPENDIX 11212
Population Projections:
Implications for a Regional
Vocational Services System
Goodwill Industries of America (G.I.A.) have stated:
B "Conservative estimates indicate that at least 2% of the population of the
average community is considered "unemployable" by business and industry,
C even in a time of prosperity. One-fourth to one-half of this number can be
rehabilitated and/or employed in Goodwill Industries."
G.I.A. experience nationally suggests that the primary disabilities of trainees
and employees are distributed as follows:











E Respective claims of CMHA and CAMR suggest that those limited by a































212. "Moyer Report" supra note 8, Table 3
271,768 5,436 2,718 1,114 856 258
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APPENDIX IV
"Declaration On the Rights Of Mentally Retarded Persons" 21 3
List Of Rights:
1. "The mentally retarded person has, to the maximum degree of feasibility, the
same rights as other human beings.
2. "The mentally retarded person has a right to proper medical care and physical
therapy and to such education, training, rehabilitation and guidance as will
enable him to develop his ability and maximum potential.
3. "The mentally retarded person has a right to economic security and to a decent
standard of living. He has a right to perform productive work, or to engage in
any other meaningful occupation to the fullest possible extent of his
capabilities.
4. "Whenever possible, the mentally retarded person should live with his own
family or with foster parents and participate in different forms of community
life. The family with which he lives should receive assistance. If care in an
institution becomes necessary, it should be provided in surroundings and other
circumstances as close as possible to those of normal life.
5. "The mentally retarded person has a right to a qualified guardian when this is
required to protect his personal wellbeing and interests.
6. "The mentally retarded person has a right to protection from exploitation,
abuse and degrading treatment. If prosecuted for any offense, he shall have a
right to due process of law with full recognition being given to his degree of
mental responsibility.
7. "Whenever mentally retarded persons are unable, because of the severity of
their handicap, to exercise all their rights in a meaningful way or it should
become necessary to restrict or deny some or all of these tights, the procedure
used for that restriction or denial of rights must contain proper legal safeguards
against every form of abuse. This procedure must be based on an evaluation of
the social capability of the mentally retarded person by qualified experts and
must be subject to periodic review and to the right of appeal to higher
authorities."
213. United Nations Resolution of the General Assembly 2856 (XXVI) dated
December 20, 1971, as quoted in R. H. Woody, Legal Aspects of Mental
Retardation: A Search for Reliability (Springfield, Illinois: C. C. Thomas, 1974),
at 46-47
